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HOTHOUSE FLOWERS:
THE VICES AND VIRTUES OF CLIMATE FEDERALISM
by JONATHAN H. ADLER*
INTRODUCTION

In 2002, California authorized the nation's fJTSt regulations governing
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles. 1 Yet California cannot enforce
regulatory limits on vehicular emissions without federal acquiescence. The federal
Clean Air Act (CAA) preempts state controls on motor vehicle ernissions. 2
California alone among the fifty states may seek a waiver of this preemption from
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)_} If such a waiver is obtained,
other states may then adopt California's standards as their own. 4 Federal approval
of California's regulatory standards is not automat\~, however. 5 Indeed, California
applied for such a waiver of preemption for its greenhouse gas rules only to be
rejected by the EPA in December 2007. 6 Unless California succeeds in overturning
the EPA's decision in federal court,? or a subsequent administration reverses
course, the Golden State cannot enforce its greenhouse gas r!Jles.
The debate and pending litigation over California's effort to obtain a waiver of
preemption has focused attention on the state role in climate change policy.

• Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Westem Reserve
University School of Law. The author would like to thank Tai Antoine and James Weikamp for their
research assistance. Any e1rors, omissions, or inanities remain those of the author alone.
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 43018.5(a) (West 2006).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) ("No state ... shall adopt any standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles.").
3. Jd. § 7543(b)(1); see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1101 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1979) [hereinafter MEMA 1] (noting that Congress intended California to "act as a kind of
laboratory for innovation" with regard to the Stale's "pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing motor
vehicle emission standards").
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(B) (providing that other states may adopt Califomia's standards).
5. See id. § 7543(b) (requiring, inter alia, a finding that the stale standard is "at least as protective
of public health and welfare" as federal standards before granting a waiver).
6. Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Adm'r, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal.
(Dec.l9, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf; see also News Release,
U.S. EPA, America Receives a National Solution for Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Dec. 19,
2007), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/
41b4663d8d3807c5852573b6008141e5!0penDocumenl ("EPA did not find that separate California
standards are needed to 'meet compelling and extraordinary conditions."'). The EPA subsequenlly
published a fmmal decision in the Federal Register. California Slate Motor Vehicle Pollution Control
Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008).
7. See Keith B. Richburg, Califomia Sues EPA Over Emissions Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2008,
at A2 (noting that California has already challenged the EPA's decision).
[4431
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California's motor vehicle regulations are the most high-profile state-level climate
policy initiative, but they are hardly alone. California itself has adopted other
greenhouse gas emission controls, including a greenhouse gas emissions cap and
rules requiring electricity providers to obtain thirty-three percent of their power
from renewable sources by 201 I.8 Other states have acted as well, adopting
renewable portfolio standards and other measures designed to reduce local
emissions of greenhouse gases. 9 Several states have also indicated their intention to
adopt California's motor vehicle rules as their own. 10 A group of northeastern
states have banded together to form the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), a collaborative effort to impose regional emission limits and create a
multistate emission trading system. 11
Although economic theory would predict that states would lag behind federal
efforts to control environmentally harmful emissions, there has been far more
action on climate change in state capitols than in Washington, D.C. 12 Without
federal action, states have stepped in to fill the policy void on climate change. 13
State-level action on climate change is unlikely, in itself, to have much impact on
atmosphetic concentrations of greenhouse gases or projected rates of future
warming. 14 N:onetheless, the level of state activity is significant.
The aggressiveness of state climate policy initiatives, and potential conflict
between federal and state regulatory measures, provides an opportunity to
reconsider the proper state role in environmental policy. There has been a vigorous
debate over the proper division of authority between the state and federal
8. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 38550 (West Supp. 2008) (providing that the state board
will determine what the statewide greenhouse gas emissions were in 1990 and then set a statewide limit
that is equivalent to that amount to be achieved by 2020); ld. § 38562 (providing that by January 1,
2011, the state board shall adopt greenhouse gas emission limits).
9. See Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & John C. Dernbach, Developing a
Comprehe11sive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of
Govenzment and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227 (2007) (summatizing state climate
initiatives). See generally BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGfNG POLITICS
OF Arv!ERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004).
10. See News Release, California Environmental Protection Agency, ARB Approves Greenhouse
Gas Rule (Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr092404.htm ("New York,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Maine, as well as the nation of
Canada, are expected to consider adopting [Califomia's] regulation for their use.").
11. Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Dec. 20, 2005, available
at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf. Given the interstate nature of the RGGI agreement,
there is some question whether it constitutes an interstate compact that requires congressional approval
before it may be enforced. See generally Katie Maxwell, Comment, Multi-State Environmental
Agreements: Constitutional Violations or Legitimate State Coordination?, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV.
355, 363-66 (2007) (detailing the constitutional criticisms of RGGI).
12. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1517-18 (2007) ("At first glance, unilateral state action to
address climate change is surprising.").
13. Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, lvficro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change
[nitiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 119 (2008).
14. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007) ("[lt is] well understood that these state-level efforts, even those of large
states such as California, will have little impact on global emissions and hence little impact on global
climate.").
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govemments within the academic literature, with many supporting greater state
autonomy over environmental policy decisions. 15 The arguments for state primacy
15. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 64 (1996) (advocating for decentralized control due to the prediction that
states will find the most cost-effective means); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING
SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 179-83 (1999) (emphasizing the need
for nimbleness which can be best provided by decentralized environmental regulation): PIETRO S.
NIVOLA & JON A. SHIELDS, MANAGING GREEN MANDATES: LOCAL RIGORS OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 3-6 (2001) (criticizing centralized control due to its one size fits all approach to
environmental regulation); DAVJD SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 22223 (2005) ("To bling environmental governance as close to home as possible, but no closer, Congress
should leave pollution control to state govemments unless the states would inflict significant harm on
outsiders . . .. "); Jonathan H. Adler, LetTing Fifry Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur
Environmental bmovarion, in THE JURJSDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND
THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 263 (Jim Chen ed., 2004) [hereinafter Adler, Lelting
Fifty Flowers Bloom] (noting that many who call for environmental refonn recognize "excessive
centralization as a fundamental problem with the existing regulatory regime"); Wallace E. Oates, A
Reconsidermion of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
1, 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002) (advocating for a reduced- federal regulatory role,
perhaps limited to providing information and guidance); Richard Revesz, Federalism and
Enl'ironmemal Regulation: A Normalive Critique, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE
TRUSTED? 97, 120 (John Ferejolm & Bmry R. Weingast, eds., 1997) (concluding that the "race-to-thebottom argument is an unsound basis for supporting federal minimum standards" for environmental
regulation); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. S70, 652 (1996)
(arguing for "a recognition that the diversity of environmental problems we face demands a range of
regulatory response strategies and levels of governmental activity"); James L. Huffman, Making
Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentra/izalion: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2004) (noting that decentralized environmental decision-making is
"presumptively better than centralized decision making" because the former better rellects the "values
and preferences of those affected," is "more adaptable" to changing knowledge and circumstances, and
produces more sustainable results); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Go1•emance:
Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189,206 (2002) (arguing for local regulation in
order to tie regulation to specific ecosystems); Robert V. Percival, EnFironmental Federalism:
Historical Roots and Colllempormy Models, 54 Jvlo. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1995) (outlining the contours
of the environmental federalism debate and noting that the "recent avalanche of federal regulation" is a
response to years of state inaction); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulmion: A
Public Choice Analysis. 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555-56 (2001) (challenging "the dominant view in the
legal academy ... that public choice pathologies cause environmental interests to be systemically
underrepresented at the state level relative to business interests"); Richard L. Revesz, The Race 10 the
Bottom and Federal Enl'ironmenlal Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 536-40
(1997) [hereinafter Revesz, Race to the Bollom] (critiquing the race-to-the-bottom criticisms in favor of
decentralized control); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking 1he "Racelo-the-Bollom'' Rmionale for Federal Environmell/al Regula/ion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211-12
(1992) (criticizing efforts to forestall state environmental regulation based on the unfounded fear that
states will race to the bottom or that federal regulation is an effective remedy should such an unlikely
phenomenon actually occur); PaulS. Weiland, Federal and S((lte Preemption of Environmemal Lmv: A
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 237,238-39 (2000) (arguing that net environmental benefits
are maximized by refusing to allow federal preemption to the extent that the federal regulation provides
a ceiling "above which the lower level of govemment may not regulate"). But see, e.g., Kirsten Engel &
Susan Rose-Ackennan, Environmental Federalism in 1he United States: The Risks of DeFolution, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 135, 137
(Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) [hereinafter Engel & Rose-Ackerman, Environmemal
Federalism] (c1iticizing the "strong devolution" approach from an economic efficiency perspective);
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Selling: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom"?,
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are greatest where environmental concerns, and potential solutions, are confined
within individual state boundaries. Where there are spillovers, however, the case
for state leadership would seem to be less strong. 16 It is somewhat ironic, then, that
states have been so aggressive in the context of climate change, where both the
environmental concern and many regulatory responses transgress state lines.
This Paper explores the role of state governments in developing climate
change policy, with a particular focus on how federalism principles and practice
should inform judgments about the division of authority between the state and
federal governments. Part I considers the vices of state action, particularly the
potential for states to free-ride on the efforts of their neighbors or to externalize the
costs of their policy preferences onto other jurisdictions. Principles of institutional
"matching" and subsidiarityl 7 suggest that states should take a back seat to national,
even international, efforts to combat climate change. Yet there ar·e still arguments
in favor of allowing states to engage in climate policy experiments. Part II
considers the vittues of state action on climate change, including the potential for
state leadership to encourage innovation and experimentation in climate policy.
The various policy considerations detailed in Parts I and II may not receive
adequate consideration under federal environmental law, which often imposes
rigid, standardized requirements across all fifty states. Some state efforts are
preempted by federal law irrespective of their policy merits. Under the CAA, the
EPA must deny California's waiver request if the state fails to meet specific
criteria. 18 Insofar as these criteria are ambiguous, the EPA is vested with some
policy discretion over whether to allow greenhouse experimentation in the Golden
State. With this in mind, Part III turns to the specifics of the California waiver and
examines the legal basis for the EPA's decision to reject the waiver request.
The CAA waiver provision is relatively unique in environmental law. Part IV
asks what environmental law might look like if the federal government took the
idea of environmental waivers more seriously. Whatever the legal or policy merits
of California's pursuit Of a waiver for motor vehicle regulations, there is much to
the idea that states should be able to seek the waiver of federal rules. preemptive

48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 278 (1997) (rejecting state regulation by relying on economic game theory);
Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 363-66 (2000)
(denouncing state environmental regulation from a public health perspective); Peter P. Swire, The Race
to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in
Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 67, 107-08 (1996) (insisting that a race to the bottom
would indeed occur despite the arguments of proponents of state regulation such as Professor Revesz).
16. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Trwzsboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932
(1997) ("Given the inherent difticulties in regulation by any single state, transboundary pollution would
seem to present a clear case for shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of
governance."); see also Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Extemalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2346 (1996) ("[T]he rationale for federal regulation premised on the problem of
interstate externalities is analytically unimpeachable but has not been effectively redressed in the cutTen!
pollution-control scheme.").
17. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Communiry
and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 338 (1994) (defining "subsidiarity" as ''[t]he notion that
action should be taken at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately
be achieved").
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(l)(A)-(C).
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and otherwise. This Part outlines the basic case for granting states access to
waivers throughout federal environmental law and briefly details what such a
waiver provision might look like.

l.

THE VICES OF CLIMATE FEDERALISM

There is a strong case for greater decentralization in environmental law . 19 As
a general structural matter, it is more efficient and effective to address
environmental problems through institutions of equivalent scope and scale with the
problem in question. Environmental protection efforts are most likely to be optimal
where those who bear the costs and reap the benefits of a given policy determine
how best, and even whether, to address a given environmental concern. This
ensures a "match" between the environmental problem and the responsible political
entity. 20 Where the scope of a given environmental problem does not match that of
the responsible institution, however, "the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and
either too little or too much environmental protection will be provided." 21
Under the principle of "subsidimity," 22 environmental problems should be
addressed at the lowest level at which they can be practically addressed. Because
most environmental problems are local or regional in natur~; applying this principle
to existing environmental laws would result in transferring primm-y authority over
many environmental problems to the state and local leveJ.2 3 Climate change is
anything but a local or regional problem, however. To the cont:rm·y, global climate
change is just that-a global environmental concern. As a consequence, the
traditional arguments for decentralization of authority over local dlinking water,

19. See generally Adler, Letting Fifiy Flowers Bloom, supra note 15, at 263-64; Jonathan H. Adler,
Jurisdictional Mismatch in Enviromnental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005) [hereinafter
Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch].
20. See BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 15, at 2 ("[T]he size of the geographic area affected by a
specific pollution source should detem1ine the appropliate governmental level for responding to the
pollution.").
21. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587 (1996). See
also Adler, Jun'sdictional Mismatch, supra note 19, at 133 ("By matchingjmisdiction with the scope of
a given problem, the institutional stmcture can ensure the greatest 'match' between a given problem and
the institutional response."); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the RegulatOIJ' Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. I, 23 (2003) (suggesting institutional mismatch can produce a
"regulatory commons" problem).
22. Bermann, supra note 17, at 338; see also Joseph A Komonchak, Subsidiarity in the Church:
I11e State of the Question, 48 TI-lE JURIST 298, 299 (1988) (quoting Pius XI's encyclical, Quadragesimo
Anno, § 79 (193 I)) ("[It is a] serious evil and a disturbance of right order to assign a larger and higher
society what can be performed successfully by smaller and lower communities."). This p1inciple is
endorsed in the principles for sustainability of Agenda 21. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. for
Sustainable Dev., Agenda 21, § I~[ 8.5(g), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151126 (June 14, 1992) (calling for
national governments to delegate environmental "responsibilities to U1e lowest level of public authority
consistent with effective action").
23. See Karkkainen, supra note 15, at 206 ("[T]here is growing recognition that ecologically sound
management must be local and/or regional in character, tailored to the ecosystem context."); Oates,
supra note 15, at 22 ("[W]here environmental quality is basically a local public good, the case for the
setting of environmental standards at an appropriately decentralized level of government is quite
compelling.").
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land use, and the like do not apply with equivalent force. Under the principle of
subsidiarity, the global nature of climate change would counsel greater
centralization of policy decisions into national, if not international, hands and less
authority for state and local governments.
State or local jurisdictions wishing to combat global climate change are
confronted with an archetypal "commons" problem. 24 The global climate is a vast
global commons to which everyone contributes greenhouse gas emissions.
Emissions anywhere on the globe contribute to the increase in atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases and the eventual warming of the atmosphere.'- 5
Any state that reduces emissions within its jmisdiction will bear the costs of such
reductions, but not reap equivalent benefits. Whatever benefits accrue from
greenhouse gas emission controls accrue globally. 26 As a consequence, states have
every incentive to "free ride" on the efforts of their neighbors, rather than suffer
costs that will yield few internal benefits. Absent cooperation or the imposition of
federal (or international) requirements, state and local efforts are unlikely to
provide anything approaching the optimal level of greenhouse mitigation measures.
Put simply, "local action is not well suited to regulating mobile global conduct
yielding a global externality." 27
The disincentive for states to take meaningful action to address climate change
is even greater than in the typical commons context, however. No state, acting
alone, is even capable of adopting emission controls that would make a dent in
global emissions, let alone global atmospheric concentrations, of greenhouse
gases. 28 Even with state-level politicies adopted to date working together, states are
not capable of reducing projected climate change and its anticipated effects to any
meaningful degree. This may help explain why, outside of California, most statelevel climate -change policies are largely symbolic. Few impose meaningful and
enforceable emission targets in the short term. 29 "Existing state-level measures are
cmTently minimal and uncertain, but even if they were more developed, their
potential effectiveness in the absence of a federal regime remains speculative at
best." 30
While state-level climate measures cannot produce direct climate benefits of
any significant degree, Professor Wiener suggests that actions taken by individual
states could be counterproductive if it results in "leakage."31 Leakage would occur
24. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragec(v of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(describing the commons problem).
25. See Christopher D. Stone, Land Use and Biodiversity, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967, 975 (2001)
(noting that carbon emissions affect the global atmosphere).
26. Wiener, supra note 14, at 1965 ("[L]ocal abatement actions pose local costs, yet deliver
essentially no local climate benefits.").
27. !d. at 1962.
28. !d. at 1966 ("[N]o state could effectively control its own ambient level of carbon dioxide or
other GHGs, because that ambient level is determined by the worldwide concentration of GHGs in the
atmosphere."); Engel & Orbach, supra note 13.
29. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 12, at 1522 ("Few states have set clear emissions
reductions targets, and fewer still have designed policies to achieve them.").
30. !d. at 1538.
31. Wiener, supra note 14, at 1963 ("[S]tate-level efforts could be not only ineffectual, but
counterproductive, increasing net global emissions and undercutting a wider effort to constrain global
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if state-level emission controls result in offsetting emission increases elsewhere. 32
If a state imposes costly emission controls on local industry, for instance, this could
encourage firms to migrate to other jurisdictions, resulting in increased emissions. 33
State-level measures to control electricity sector emissions could produce leakage
insofar as they encourage utilities to obtain power from out-of-state sources that are
not subject to such controls. 34 Few state policies even attempt to address such
concerns, and any that do may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 35 Vvhile it may be unlikely that leakage would result
in a net increase in global emissions, the potential for leakage caused by state-level
regulatory measures could be an additional vice of state-level climate policies.
States are more likely to adopt meaningful emission reductions if they can
externalize the costs of such measures on other jurisdictions. Such regional rentseeking has been well documented in environmental law 36 and may occur in the
climate context as welJ.3 7 Consider the various public nuisance lawsuits filed by
state attorneys general against out-of-state firms. 38 State officials who file such
suits get the political benefits of appearing to take action agaii)St climate change,
without having to bear the costs of imposing economic burdens oi1 in-state firms.
In the case of a nationally or globally dispersed pollutant, state regulation will
often be less efficient than available alternatives. Localized measures are also
likely to be more costly, and less cost-effective, than national measures_. 39 A local
cap-and-trade system, for example, will cover a more limited set of sources, and
fewer savings opportunities, than a national system with a broader base. 40
Subjecting businesses to a variety of state standards may also be less efficient than
a standardized federal regulatory regime. 41

emissions.").
32. !d. at 1968-69.
33. ld. at 1971 ("If leakage exceeds 100%, the subglobal regime would actually increase global
emissions.").
34. ld. at 1969.
35. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 12, al 1532.
36. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirry Profirs: Rell/-Seeking Behind rhe Green Curtain, in
POLITICAL ENVffiONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 1, 6-9 (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
2000) (summarizing notable examples of regional rent-seeking in environmental law).
37. See Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptisrs, and rhe Global Wanning Barrie, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2002) (detailing potential for rent-seeking in context of climate change
policy).
38. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F Supp. 2d 265, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding that the claim against electric utilities for abatement of global warming raised non-justiciable
political questions); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2
(N.D. Cal. SepL 17, 2007) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss claim of automakers' creation of,
contribution to, and maintenance of a public nuisance).
39. Wiener, supra note 14, at 1967 (noting a national emissions control regime "forfeits the greater
cost savings obtainable in a larger allowance trading market encompassing more countries").
40. !d.
41. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 12, at 1531 ("Firms operating in multiple states may well find
that the states are adopting different approaches to achieve the same objective, making compliance
confusing and potentially costly."); Peterson, McKinstry & Dembach, supra note 9; Wiener, supra note
14, at 1974 ("Differences across state policies may impede collaborative linking among states .... ").
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State regulation of products sold in national markets can be particularly
inefficient:12 Where a given product is bought and sold in national markets, and
will travel throughout interstate commerce, it is less costly to design and produce
the product so as to conform with a single national standard. 43 For instance, if
California and several northeastern states adopt more stringent emission standards
for automobiles, and this produces a de facto national standard that increases
production costs, consumers in other states may end up bearing a portion of the
costs of more polluted states' preference for cleaner vehicles. 44 Such costs may be
less significant today than at the time when most federal environmental statutes
were adopted. 45 Nonetheless, the loss of economies of scale in national production
of products sold in national markets is a potential vice of state-level regulation that
wan-ants consideration.
II. THE VIRTUES OF CLIMATE FEDERALISM

Despite the vices of state-level climate policies, state-level experimentation
and involvement in climate change could still have significant virtues. Among
other things, state initiatives may serve as useful experiments on the efficacy of
various climate policy measures and do a better job addressing local preferences
and information about sources of climate emissions and the relative costs and
benefits of mitigation strategies. In addition, insofar as the threat of climate change
calls for greater consideration of adaptation, state and local governments may be
particularly well-situated to develop such measures.
The best and most cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is
not self-evident. Assuming agreement on how much to reduce emissions from a
given sector, there is still a myriad of different ways to implement such controls.
Some regulatory designs will entail greater transaction costs while others may
facilitate transparency or enforcement. 46 An emission-trading regime may help
focus emission reductions on those firms capable of cutting emissions at lowest
cost. At the same time, a trading, regime may be more costly and time-consuming
to implement and enforce. Even if such problems are overcome, questions remain
42. Engel & Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Federalism, supra note 15, at 137 ("Uniform national
regulation may produce economies of scale of production and distribution for firms selling nationally.").
See also NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 17 ("Business interests, not without justification, often
prefer nationwide regulatory standards to a hodgepodge of local rules: broad scope and standardization
may lower uncertainty and increase efficiency."); SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 218 (defending
federal regulation of pesticide safety because pesticides are "nationally distributed").
43. See Oates, supra note 15, at 21 ("It would obviously be very costly for auto manufacturers lo
have to produce 50 different variants of cars to satisfy the particular emissions standards of each state.").
44. See PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 17 (2004) (noting adoption of emission
regulations in California may "force" automakers to comply with the standard nationwide "since it is not
feasible to produce two separate sets of cars").
45. See Adler, Jurisdicriona/ Mismatch, supra note 19, at 149-50 ("[S]urnmarizing production
advances that may lower costs of regional customization.").
46. See generally Byron Swift, How Environmental La It's Work: A1z Analysis of the Utility Sector's
Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL.
ENVTL LJ. 309 (2001) (finding dramatic differences in efficiency and effectiveness of regulatory
programs for gases).
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about the ideal manner to allocate emission credits and account for various
mitigation measures, such as the creation of carbon sinks.
Allowing individual states to act as environmental "laboratories" can produce
useful information about the relative cost-effectiveness of vmious mitigation
measuresY If states are free to experiment with competing policy designs, other
states and the federal government can learn from state policy successes. Several
federal environmental statutes are modeled, at least in part, on state programs. 48
Even where such experiments fail, useful information will result. 49 Experience in
other contexts has shown that interjurisdictional competition can encourage policy
innovation as policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental, and other
demands of their constituents. 50 In tllis way, state experimentation in the climate
context could improve federal climate policies.
Some advocates of more aggressive climate policy measures note that the
adoption of state environmental measures has often prompted the enactment of
federal policies. 51 If a state initiative is particularly successf1.1l, it may encourage
federal regulation. Even if state measures are not so successful, they may still
create incentives for federal action, even if only to preempt state rules with a
uniform federal standard. As has occurred in the past, state greenhouse gas
regulations could prompt industry support for national standards that would
preempt variable state controls. 52
One problem with overly centralized regulatory systems is that they tend to be
overly rigid and poorly tailored to the specific environmental and econonlic

47. FARBER, supra note 15, at 182 (discussing importance of states as policy "laboratories"). The
laboratories metaphor comes from Justice Brandeis. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
3II (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments wilhoultisk to the rest of the country.").
48. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State,
Local, and Private Leadership in Developing StraTegies to Mitigate The Causes and Effects of Climate
Change, 12 PENN Sr. ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 16 (2004) (citing examples of federal environmental laws
modeled on state predecessors).
49. See TESKE, supra note 44, at 240 (noting that, even when stale experiments "fail, they provide
important information for other states and for national policy"); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D.
Peterson, The Implications of the New "Old" Federalism in Climate-Change Legislation: How to
FuncTion in a Global Marketplace when States Take The Lead, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. &
DEY. L.J. 61, 88 (2007) ("An innovation in a particular state that fails will have Jess of an impact on the
national economy than a federal experiment that fails. Innovative state programs can provide examples
of what to do or what not to do.").
50. See generally Charles M. Tieboul, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956) (presenting a solution for deterrnining the level of expenditures for local public goods which
better reflects population preferences than at the national level).
51. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a TheOIJ' af
Statutory Evolution: Tl1e Federalization af Environme111al Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985)
(citing federal air pollution statutes in the 1960s which were passed because the automobile and soft coal
industries were not satisfied with state and local environmental laws).
52. See id. at 330 (discussing California's adoption of emission standards for new motor vehicles in
the 1960s, which prompted the U.S. auto industry to support federal emission standards that would
preempt slate rules). See generally DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 12, at 1533-38 (discussing the
"success" of state environmental initiatives in stimulating federal regulation).
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conditions of local jurisdictionsY The inability of centralized systems to take into
account local environmental conditions, let alone local tastes, preferences: and
economic conditions, leads to "one size fits all" policies that fit few areas well, if at
ali.54 The ecological and economic diversity of the nation requires locallmowledge
and expertise that is often unavailable at the federal leveP 5 A more decentralized
system is better able to overcome this "lmowledge problem"56 and ensure that
regulatory measures take account of local conditionsY Although global climate
change is a global problem, the most efficient or cost-effective policy measures
may still vary from place to place. 58 Depending on the relative mix of emission
sources in a given location, and the relative cost of emission controls or other
mitigation measures, a different policy mix will be optimal.
Professor Ann Carlson suggests that a related benefit of allowing state
experimentation in climate policy is that state measures may encourage
technological innovation insofar as they are effective at inducing private investment
in the development of technologies and other measures to meet local emission
controls. 59 Such measures might be particularly effective at inducing local
investment if firms believe that state-level measures are likely to be replicated in
other states or at the national level. States might also believe that they can obtain a
"first-mover" advantage by adopting regulatory standards that are likely to be
adopted elsewhere. 50

53. Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Westem States and Environmemal Federalism: An Rwmination
of Institutional Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 225, 225-26 (TetTy L. Anderson & Peter J.
Hill eds., 1997).
54. See id. ("There is a recognition that homogenous solutions applied to heterogeneous problems
often yield high costs and weak results."). While, as a theoretical matter, federal regulation could take
into account regional variation, "federal regulation generally imposes unifmm requirements throughout
the country" and, where variable standards exist, they are not due to regional environmental differences.
Revesz, Race to the Bottom, supra note 15, at 537.
55. See BUTLER &MACEY, supra note 15, at 27 ("Federal regulators never have been and never will
be able to acquire and assimilate "the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal
regulatory judgments that reflect the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution
sources."); John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Mo. L. REV. 1183,
1218 (1995) ("The knowledge necessary to administer any air pollution control program ... can be
found only at the local level."); Alistair Ulph, Harmonization and Optimal Environmental Policy in a
Federal System with Asymmetric Information, 39 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 224,225-26 (2000) ("[T]he
federal government may not have sufficient information about the different environmental
charactetistics of states to compute environmental policies which differ across states.").
56. See generally F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REV. 519, 519-20
(1945) (detailing the economic problem resulting from the fact that "the knowledge of the circumstances
of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed
bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess").
57. FARBER, supra note !5, at 180 ("By decentralizing environmental decision making, we may be
able to obtain improved responsiveness to changing circumstances and new infonnation.").
58. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 49, at 87-88 ("[An] advantage of state-based programs is
the ability to develop more nmTowly drawn targets that are appropriate for the region and the industries.
For example, strategies aimed at smart growth to reduce miles driven are best targeted in growing
areas.").
59. Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Elllissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 281, 313-15 (2003).
60. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 13, at 134 ("Because the regulation of greenhouse gases is
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State and local governments may also have a comparative advantage in
developing climate adaptation measures. Particularly given the impossibility of
adopting enforceable emission controls that will have any appreciable effect on
projected warming over the next few decades, some measure of adaptation to
projected climate changes is essential. 61 Optimal adaptation strategies will be
anything but uniform, however. While global climate change is a global
phenomenon, it will produce variable regional effects. Insofar as predictions of
likely climatic changes are possible, it is understood that such changes will vary
substantially from place to place.
Consider the likely effects on precipitation and water supplies. Insofar as a
gradual warming of the earth's temperature alters precipitation pattems, rainfall is
likely to increase in some places, while declining in others. 62 The timing and
intensity of precipitation events will also be affected, but in a non-uniform
manner. 63 The same is true for snowmelt, evaporation, and so on. Such changes
will vary regionally. As the 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change concluded: "Freshwater resources will be affected by climate change across
Canada and the U.S., but the nature of the vulnerabilities v,aries from region to
region. " 64
Because the unavoidable consequences of climate change will vary from state
to state, and region to region, so too will the optimal mix of adaptation measures.
Some jurisdictions may need to prepare for potential rises in sea level. Others may
need to prepare for the possibility of drought. Still others may need to plan for
both. In the case of emission controls, local jurisdictions do not bear the costs, and
are not capable of capturing the benefits, of locally imposed measures. Yet this is
not the case with adaptation.
Ill. THE CASE OF THE CALIFORNIA WAIVER
California's effort to adopt the nation's first greenhouse gas emission controls
on new motor vehicles has prompted renewed debate over the proper state role in
climate change. 65 The outcome of this debate, and Califomia's efforts to obtain a
waiver of preemption for its regulations, could have a significant and lasting effect
on climate change policy in the United States. It may also inform future debates on
likely to lead to the formation of emission markets, first movers will be able to generate tradeable credits
for use in ft~ture markets.").
61. See Roger Pielke Jr. et al., Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597, 597 (2007)
(noting that adaptation "is crucial to deal with the unavoidable impacts of climate change to which the
world is already committed").
62. See S. Vicuna & J.A. Dracup, The Evolution of Climate Change Impact Studies on Hydrology
and Water Resources in Califomia, 82 CLIMATIC CHANGE 327,327-28 (2007) (noting that the impact of
global warming "will vary for different regions of the earth").
63. !d. at 335.
64. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 627 (Martin Pany et al., eds., 2007).
65. See, e.g., Danen Goode, Suggestion of State Preemption Sets Off Waming Bells, CONGRESS
DAILY, Feb. 26, 2008 (noting that "[t]he state pre-emption issue is a major component of discussions in
congressional efforts to address climate change" since California proposed a statewide limit on
greenhouse gas emissions).
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the respective roles of the federal and state governments in environmental policy
more generally. As a consequence, the waiver controversy warrants fuller
examination.
In July 2002, the California state legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1493,
directing the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to "develop and adopt
regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles." 66 Pursuant to this legislation,
CARB approved regulations amending its existing "Low-Emission Vehicle (LEV
II)" program to establish declining fleet average greenhouse gas emission standards
in September 2004. 67 The regulations apply to four greenhouse gases-carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons-but are enforced by
reference to the carbon-dioxide equivalent of a vehicle's emissions. 68 Under
CARB 's regulations, the emission standards are to take effect beginning with the
2009 vehicle model year and decline in subsequent model years. 69 By 2016, new
vehicle emissions must decline by nearly thirty percent. 70 If allowed to proceed,
California's rules will not remain California's alone, however. Several other states
have announced their plans to follow California's lead, adopting the regulations as
their own. 71
In December 2005, CARE submitted a formal request for a waiver of CAA
preemption to the EPA. 72 At the time, there was some legal uncertainty as to
whether the EPA could grant the waiver because the EPA then maintained that it
lacked authmity over greenhouse gases under the CAA. 73 After the Supreme
Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 74 holding that the EPA did indeed have
such authority/5 many assumed that a waiver would issue shortly. Testifying
before the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works in May 2007,
California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. declared, "If EPA follows the
law, there's no qu~stion that it must grant California's waiver." 76 Yet the actual
66. A.B. 1493, ch. 200, § 3(a) (Cal. 2002) (codified CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 430!8.5(a)
(West 2006)).
.•
67. California Air Resources Board, Climate Change Emission Control Regulations Fact Sheet 1-2
(Dec. !0, 2004), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/cc_newfs.pdf.
68. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 196l.l(e)(4) (2008); California Air Resources Board, supra note 67,
at l.
69. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § !96l.l(a)(l)(A); Califomia Air Resources Board, supra note 67, at
2.
70. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § l96l.l(a)(l)(A); Califomia Air Resources Board, supra note 67, at
2.
71. See News Release, California Environmental Protection Agency, supra note !0 ("New York,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Maine, as well as the nation of
Canada, are expected to consider adopting [Califomia's] regulation for their use.").
72. David Givens, Califomia 's Chances of Clean Air Act Waiver Look Good: CRS Report, WORLD
FUELS TODAY, Sept. 10,2007.
73. !d.
74. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
75. /d. at 1462-63; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Warming up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA.
L. REv. IN BRIEF 61, 70-71 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/
adler.pdf (discussing the legal implications of Massachusetts v. EPA).
76. Califomia Greenhouse Gas Regulation Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air &
Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Envirownent & Public Works, !lOth Cong. (2007) (statement of
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case for California's waiver request is less clear than Brown would suggest. 77 Even
some who have been sharply critical of the waiver denial on policy grounds
aclmowledge the plausibility of the EPA's legal position against the waiver. 78
Waiver requests are governed by Section 209 of the CAA. Section 209(a)
provides that no state may adopt or enforce "any standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines" subject to
regulation under the Act. 79 The purpose of this provision is to maintain a national
market for motor vehicles by providing for uniformity in vehicle emission
standards. 80 Any motor vehicle produced anywhere in the United States may be
sold anywhere else in the country so long as it complies with federal emission
control regulations. 81 A uniform national standard prevents the balkanization of the
national automobile market that could result if automakers were subject to different
regulatory requirements in different states. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, in Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n (MEMA) v. EPA, 82 explained
the necessity of a uniform standard in response to an industry challenge to EPA's
approval of a prior waiver request:
Congress' entry into the field and heightened state activity after 1965
raised the spectre of an anarchic patchwork of federal and state
regulatory programs, a prospect which threatened to create
nightmares for the manufacturers. Acting on this concern, Congress
in 1967 expressed its intent to occupy the regulatory role·' over
emissions control to the exclusion of all the states all, that is, except
Califomia. 83

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Att'y Gen. of California). Environmental law experts were more circumspect.
Speaking to the Associated Press, Sean Hecht of the UCLA Environmental Law Center commented that,
after Massac/wsens v. EPA, "[i]t's clear EPA has to consider Califomia's waiver request now," but "that
doesn't mean it's a foregone conclusion with respect to the waiver request." Samantha Young, EPA
Revives Cal(fomia Emissions Rule, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 4, 2007, available at
http://www. boston .com/news/nation/arti cles/2007 /04/04/ epa_revi ves_california_ emissions_ ru Ie/.
77. For an overview of the issues presented by California's waiver request, see Jonathan H. Adler,
Can the Golden State Catch a Greenhouse Waiver?, ENGAGE, Oct. 2007, at 75, 77 [hereinafter Adler,
Golden State Waiver].
78. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Let Califomia Experiment, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 28, 2007
(acknowledging "residual statutory uncertainties" and the possibility that EPA would "succeed in
defending its denial" of the waiver); Editorial, The Califomia Waiver, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2008, at
A20 (arguing EPA relied on "legal technicality to justify bad policy").
79. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). This provision provides:
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines
subject to this part. No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval
relating to the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle
engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such
motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment.
!d.
80. !d. § 7543(b)(2).
81. Adler, Golden State Waiver, supra note 77, at 77.
82. 627 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
83. !d. at 1109.
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Indeed, it is well documented that the major automakers themselves supported
adoption of federal vehicle emission controls in order to preempt the proliferation
of variable state standards. 84
The CAA contains one exception to this general policy of preemption.
Recognizing California's particularly severe air pollution problems, and the Golden
State's pioneering efforts to control mobile source air pollution, Congress adopted
Section 209(b), authmizing a waiver of preemption for California. 85 This provision
effectively grandfathered California's pre-existing e!1llsswns controls and
authorized a potential exemption for additional emissions controls adopted there in
the future. 86 Once the EPA grants a waiver, other states are permitted to adopt
California's regulations as a part of their own air pollution control programs under
CAA Section 177, 87 but they are never allowed to adopt vehicle emission standards
of their own. As a consequence, there can never be more than two sets of vehicle
emission standards-those set by the EPA, and those set by California.
Waivers of preemption for California are not automatic. Rather, waiver
requests must satisfy specific statutory criteria enumerated in CAA Section
209(b). 88 Section 209(b)(l) provides that, before California can receive a waiver, it
must make a threshold determination that its proposed standards "will be in the
aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal
standards." 89 Once California has made such a determination, and seeks a waiver,
Section 209(b) provides that the EPA must deny a waiver if the EPA finds that:
"(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious, (B) such State does
not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or
(C) such State, standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not
consistent with section 202(a) of this part." 90 An EPA finding that any one of these
three criteria is met requires the rejection of California's waiver request.
EPA review of a California waiver request is fairly deferential. As the D.C.
Circuit held in MEMf! v. EPA, "California's regulations, and California's
determination that they comply with the statute, ... are presumed to satisfy the
waiver requirements and that the burden of proving otherwise is on whoever
84. See Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 51, at 330 (discussing automakers' roles in the
adoption of federal vehicle emission standards).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
86. Section 209(b)(l) provides, among other things, that:
The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive application
of this section to any State which has adopted standards ... for the control of emissions
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State
determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public
health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.
42 U.S.C. § 7532(b)(l). As California was the only state to adopt vehicle emission standards ptior to
March 30, 1966, this provision operates as a special provision for California only.
87. 42 u.s.c. § 7507(2).
88. !d. § 7 543(b ).
89. Id. § 7543(b)(l).
90. ld. § 7543(b)(l)(A)·(C); see also MEMA I, 627 F.2d at Ill! ("[I]f the Administrator makes any
one of these findings with respect to a waiver request involving California 'standards' he must deny the
request.").
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attacks them. " 91 Nor does the EPA have any authority to consider crite1ia beyond
those enumerated in Section 209(b) when making a waiver detennination. 92
Up until now, the EPA had accommodated California's efforts to adopt more
stiingent vehicular air pollution controls. Indeed, prior to 2007, the EPA had never
completely denied a waiver request under Section 209(b). 93 However, until now,
California had always sought waivers for measures that addressed the state's
notoriously severe local air pollution problems, such as those that have plagued the
southern portions of the state. 94 A waiver application for control of greenhouse gas
emissions raises some distinct issues. 95
EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson announced he would deny California's
request for a waiver of preemption on December 19, 2007. 96 According to Jolmson,
California's regulations were not eligible for a waiver of preemption under the
CAA. 97 Explaining the decision in a letter to California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, Johnson noted the differences between greenhouse gases and
other motor vehicle e1nissions subject to regulation under air pollution laws:
Unlike other air pollutants covered by previous waivers, greenhouse
gases are fundamentally global in nature. ·Greenhouse gases
contJibute to the problem of global climate change, a problem that
poses challenges for the entire nation and indeed the world. Unlike
pollutants covered by the other waivers, greenhouse gas emissions
harm the environment in California and elsewhere regardless of
where the emissions occur. In other words, this challenge is not
exclusive or unique to Califomia and differs in a basic way from the
previous local and regional air pollution problems addressed in prior
waivers. 98
While Johnson noted his policy preference for the adoption of nationally uniform
motor vehicle emission regulations, he grounded his explanation of the permit
denial in California's failure to meet the second criterion listed in Section 209(b). 99
Specifically, he found that California does not "need" its regulations "to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions." 100
In March 2008, the EPA elaborated on its reasons for denying California's
waiver request. 101 The EPA explained that Section 209(b) of the CAA was

91. MEMA I, 627 F.2d at 1121.
92. ld. atlll9.
93. Carlson, supra note 59, at 293. As Professor Carlson notes, however, the EPA "has sometimes
denied part of a waiver or delayed implementation of California emissions standards." !d.
94. Id at296-97.
95. !d.
96. Letter from Stephen L. Johnson to Arnold Schwarzenegger, supra note 6, at 2.
97. !d.
98. !d. at 1.
99. !d. at 2.
JOO. See id. (declming that California regulations do not have to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions).
JOJ. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, supra note 6.
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designed to enable California to adopt vehicular regulations "to address pollution
problems that are local or regional," and not global environmental concerns.
Therefore, the Agency reasoned, California was not entitled to the same degree of
deference as with more traditional air pollution control measures. While explicitly
recognizing that "global climate change is a serious challenge," and that warming
was likely to have adverse effects in California, such threats were not "compelling
and extraordinary compared to the effects in the rest of the country."!0 2 As the
Agency explained, "Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are an air
pollution problem that is global in nature, and this air pollution problem does not
bear the same causal link to factors local to California as do local or regional air
pollution problerns."I03
While there is room to debate whether or not the EPA should have granted
California's waiver request as a matter of policy, there is ample statutory basis for
Administrator Johnson's decision as a matter oflaw. Section 209 seeks to strike a
balance between the desire for a nationally uniform regulatory regime for motor
vehicles and the need of California (and other states) to adopt more stringent
pollution controls in order to protect the health and welfare of their citizens. tD4 The
presumption in Section 209 is that motor vehicle emission standards should be
nationally uniform. This is the basis for the broad preemption contained in Section
209(a).w5 This presumption of preemption is not unassailable, however. Section
209(b) balances the federal interest in uniform regulation with California's historic
need for more stringent emission controls to combat California's particularly
difficult air pollution problems. As noted above, Section 209(b) requires EPA to
reject Califm~nia' s waiver request if the Agency determines that California "does
not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions."L 06
Thus, California can obtain a waiver of preemption unless the state does not "need"
more stringent regulations to meet the state's own air pollution problems.w7 Where
such a need exists, .t?is need may outweigh the federal interest in preemption.
Where such a need is lacking, such as where California's air pollution problems are
not particularly severe, or where a regulatory measure will not address California's
environmental ills, the national interest in regulatory uniformity predominates.
In ptior waiver requests, California was able to argue that more stringent
controls on vehicular emissions were necessary due to California's uniquely severe
urban air pollution problems, the difficulty some California metropolitan areas
would otherwise have meeting applicable National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
and the comparatively large contribution made by mobile source emissions to
California's air pollution problems.ws None of these arguments are applicable in
the context of global climate change, however.
102. ld.
103. ld.
104. 49 u.s.c. § 7543(b).
105. Of some relevance, other federal statutes also preempt state regulations of motor vehicles, but
lack any waiver preemption. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2006) (balancing the federal interest in uniform
regulation with California's historic need for more stringent emission controls).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(l)(B).
107. ld.
l08. Adler, Golden State Waiver, supra note 77, at 77.
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The argument that climate change cannot satisfy the second criterion of
Section 209(b) is not based upon any skepticism about humanity's contribution to
climate change. Nor is it dependent upon rejecting predictions that increases in
global temperature brought about by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases
could have negative ecological and other effects in California. As a coastal state,
California may be threatened by sea-level rise in a way that land-locked states
cannot be. !09 California's unique geography and ecological conditions mean that
temperature increases will trigger different types of secondary effects there than
elsewhere. 110 Yet Section 209(b) almost certainly requires that California do more
than show that anthropogenic emissions are causing an increase in atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases that, in turn, contribute to a gradual warming of
the climate, and that such warming could have negative effects. 111
To read the second criterion of Section 209(b) so as to require only that global
warming is a serious, even "compelling and extraordinary" environmental concern
is to make this waiver condition wholly redundant with the CAA standard for
setting federal emissions standards in the first instance. CAA Section 202(a)(l)
requires the EPA to adopt controls on emissions from new motor vehicles that, in
the judgment of the EPA Administrator, "cause, or GOntribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public nealth or welfare." 112 Tins
is the standard for adopting federal controls on vehicular emissions of a given
pollutant. 113 Section 209(b) provides for a waiver of preemption for California
regulations controlling pollutants that are already subject to, regulation under
Section 202(a). 114 Therefore, to justify a waiver under Section 209(b), California
must demonstrate something more than that the accumulation of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere will contribute to global warming that, in turn, may have some
deleterious effects in California that could "endanger public health or welfare. " 115
If Section 209(b) authorized the EPA to grant a waiver for any pollutant that could
have such effects it would, by definition, apply to every pollutant for wllich there is
a standard under Section 202(a). Assunling the language of Section 209(b) serves
some purpose within the Act, it must create a different and more demanding
standard than that which triggers federal regulation under Section 202(a).
The most sensible reading of Section 209(b) is that Califonlia must be able to
show that Califontia needs more stringent standards than those provided by the
109. See generally Lesley Ewing, OwJview of Sea Levels Rise and Some Implications for Coasral
Califomia, in RISING TIDES, ERODING SHORES: THE LEGAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SEA LEVEL RISE
AND COASTAL EROSION 8 (2001) (on file with author).

110. ld.
IlL ld.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 752l(a)(l). The provision provides that:
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in
accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.

!d.
113. Id.
114. See id. § 7543(b) (stipulating waiver criteria).
115. Id.
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EPA to meet specific conditions or concerns in California. The environmental
problem California wishes to combat must be "extraordinary"-that is, it cannot be
the typical sort of air pollution problem and must vary in either kind or degree from
environmental conditions elsewhere. Yet because global climate change is, by
definition, a global phenomenon, California cannot claim that it faces a unique
problem as distinct from that faced by the nation as a whole. Thus, California's
greenhouse gas waiver request does not satisfy the plain meaning of Section
209(b). Even if one were to conclude that this is not the plain meaning of Section
209(b), and that the meaning of the legislative language is somewhat ambiguous,
tllis would not undercut the EPA's legal authority to deny California's waiver
request, as courts must defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of
ambiguous statutory text under the Chevron doctrine.lt 6
CARE argues that "California need not demonstrate ... that the state faces
unique threats from greenhouse gas enlissions" and that it is enough that the state
faces "extraordinary and compelling conditions generally."tl7 The basis for this
argument is that the EPA has traditionally evaluated California waiver requests as
applied to emissions control programs as opposed to individual standards.tts
According to CARB, "[T]he relevant inquiry under Section 209(b)(l)(B) is whether
California needs its own emission control program to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions, not whether any given standard is necessary to meet such
conditions."ll 9 Because it is clear that California does experience the sort of
"compelling and extraordinary conditions" that justify a California-specific
enlissions control program, CARE reasons, the greenhouse gas enlissions controls
must be perrnitted as welJ.l2°
There is some merit to CARB 's argument. As interpreted by the EPA, Section
209(b) does not authorize or require the EPA to analyze separately each individual
component of each program for which CARB seeks a waiver of preemption.
Rather, the EPA may look at programs as a whole, recognizing that the waiver
provision is designed ,to enable California regulators to tailor a set of standards to
California-specific po!Iution concerns and make different trade-offs than those
embodied in relevant federal standards.tzt But this does not mean-indeed, cannot
mean-that once California had adopted its first vehicular ernissions control
program, it would be able to adopt any and all enlissions control standards from
that point forward that satisfied the remaining 209(b) criteria. Here, California
seeks to adopt a new set of standards to address a previously unregulated
environmental concern. The mere existence California's preexisting enlissions
control program, for which preemption was waived, does not require a waiver for
116. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth
the legal analysis for determining whether to grant deference to a government agency's interpretation of
its own statutmy mandate).
117. California Air Resources Board, Regulations to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor
Vehicles, Request for Waiver of Preemption Under Clean Air Act Section 209(b): Support Document
(Attachment 2), at 16 (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/att2_support.pdf.
ll8. !d.
119. !d. at 15.
120. !d. at 15-16.
121. !d. at 16.
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the new standards as well, and the EPA would be wholly justified-if not
required-to ensure that California's greenhouse gas emissions controls satisfy
Section 209(b)(l)(B), as have those measures adopted before it.
Nor can California claim that it needs its greenhouse gas emissions controls to
"meet" the threat posed by climate change, as adoption of these measures will not
have any meaningful (if even measurable) effect on global climate change, let alone
the specific effects of climate change about which Californians· are concerned.
Even were all developed nations to fully comply with the greenhouse gas emissions
reduction targets established by the Kyoto Protocol and maintain such controls
through 2100, this would only change the predicted future warming by 0.15 ac by
2100. In Such emissions reductions would be several times greater than the
complete elimination of all greenhouse gas emissions from the U.S. transportation
sector, let alone any realistic estimate of emissions reductions to be achieved from
the imposition of regulatory controls on new motor vehicles nationwide, let alone
in California and a handful of other states. 123 California cannot "need" its
greenhouse gas regulations to meet the compelling threat of climate change as the
regulations would make no difference to the projected effects of climate change in
the state.
It is certainly possible that the EPA could have interpreted the language of
Section 209(b) in a manner more favorable to California's waiver request. Under
such an interpretation, any state measure designed to combat the "compelling and
extraordinary" threat posed by global climate change that meets Section 209(b )' s
other criteria would be eligible for a waiver of preemption. This wm!"ld appear to
be a permissible interpretation of the statutory text, but it is difficult to argue that
this is the clear and unambiguous meaning of Section 209(b). As a consequence,
the EPA's decision to deny California's waiver is almost surely based upon a
permissible reading of the relevant language and should be upheld in federal
court.124
If California is to have the freedom to adopt its own greenhouse gas emissions
controls on new motor vehicles, a new administration must adopt a new approach
to Section 209, or Congress should intervene on the Golden State's behalf.
Testifying before the Senate Environment Committee in May 2007, California
Attorney General Brown, himself a former governor, suggested that, if the EPA
refuses to grant a waiver, "Congress has to allow California to blaze its own trail
with a minimum of federal oversight." 125 As he suggested, perhaps inadvertently, if
Californians really want freedom from federal preemption and a change in federal
climate policy, they are better off getting Congress to act than seeking relief from

122. T.M.L. Wigley, The Kyoto Protocol: C02, CH4 and Climate Implications, 25 GEOPHYSICAL
REs. LETTERS 2285, 2287-88 (1998).
123. See id. at 2288 ("The Protocol ... can be considered as only a first and relatively small step
towards stabilizing the climate. The influence of the Protocol would, furthermore, be undetectable for
many decades.").
124. This is a normative statement and not a prediction of what reviewing courts will actually do.
125. Jonathan H. Adler, Can Califomia Catch a Waiver?, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, May 24, 2007,
http://article.nationalrevie\v.com/?q=Y\VVIOGEzZjk3NWE5Mml2Yzk1MWZjZmUyNjNkYmJkZjA=.

462

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:2

the EPA. The extent to which states are free to deviate from federal environmental
policies is ultimately up to Congress.
IV.

TAKING

W ANERS SERIOUSLY

The debate over California's request for a waiver of preemption under the
CAA highlights the rigidity of federal environmental law. Section 209(b) is one of
the few federal environmental statutory provisions that allows a state meaningful
relief from federal regulatory controls, and it still may not be enough to grant
California the flexibility it wants. While many federal environmental statutes
allegedly embody a "cooperative federalism" approach to environmental policy, in
practice most federal environmental programs impose top-down regulatory
requirements that are rigidly applied throughout the nation. 126
California may well deserve a waiver of preemption so that it may continue to
experiment with potential greenhouse gas emissions control policies. Yet any
setious policy argument for granting California a waiver in this instance would also
justify authorizing waivers for other states to experiment in other areas in
environmental law.
The policy arguments for increased flexibility in the
development of drinking water protection programs or local waste-site cleanup are
far stronger than those for individual state regulation of products manufactured for
national markets to address a globally dispersed pollution concern. The problem,
however, is that CAA Section 209 authorizes potential waivers for California's air
pollution control strategies, but waiver provisions in other environmental laws are
few and far between. 127 If policymakers wish to see California and other states
experiment here, they should be willing to authorize broader experiments
throughout much,of the rest of environmental law.
One way to provide states with greater authority to experiment in
environmental law would be to allow for waivers from federal environmental laws
across the board. Elsewhere, this author has proposed a policy of "ecological
forbearance," under which states could petition federal agencies for waivers from
federal requirements. 128 The model for this proposal is section 160 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 129 Tllis provision was added to federal
conmmnications law because Congress recognized the difficulty of adopting a
dynanlic
and
fast-changing
uniform
regulatory
structure
for
the
telecommunications industry. 130 Section 160 created a mechanism through which

126. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modem EnFironmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795,
805-37 (2005) (discussing the current debates regarding who should have the power to regulate the
environment).
127. See, e.g., Preemption of State Standards and Waiver Procedures for Nom·oad Engines and
Nonroad Vehicles, 40 C.F.R. § 85.1603 (2007) (describing the preemptive effect of a federal
environmental law on the laws of states and other political subdivisions).
128. Adler, Letting Fifty FloH•ers Bloom, supra note IS, at 272-81; see FARBER, supra note 15, at
194-98 (suggesting a similar proposal).
129. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2006). Professor Farber likewise identifies section 160 as a potential model
for environmental reform. FARBER, supra note 15, at 194-98.
130. See Phillip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperatil'e Federalism, and the Enforcement of
the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1698-1702 (2001) (discussing the rationale behind the
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the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) could respond to changes in
technology or market conditions by removing regulatory controls on firms that
applied for such relief. 131
Specifically, Section 160(a) provides that "the Commission shall forbear from
applying any regulation or any provision" of the Communications Act to a
telecommunications company or service (or class thereof) "in any or some of its or
their geographic markets" if the FCC determines that (a) "enforcement of such
regulation or provision is not necessary" to ensure that rates "are just and
reasonable and are not umeasonably discriminatory," (b) "enforcement of such
regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers," and (c)
"forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the
public interest." 132 In making this determination, the FCC is further instructed to
consider the impact on "competitive market conditions" and is explicitly permitted
to equate an increase in competition among service providers with the public
Regulated firms seeking forbearance are required to provide
interest. 133
supplemental information supporting their claim for relief, and the FCC is required
to act upon such petitions in a timely fashion. 134 Further,.fCC decisions to grant or
deny a forbearance request are final agency actions subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring the commission justify its decisions
with reasoned decision-making. 135
A policy of "ecological forbearance" would replicate thi.s process in the
environmental realm. The one key difference is that states, rather than individual
regulated firms, would submit the forbearance petitions. 136 Under this proposal,
states would petition the EPA Administrator by seeking the forbearance of a
standard or requirement imposed by or pursuant to an environmental statute
administered by EPA. One state might seek permission to adopt a different
drinking water standard, whereas another might seek more flexibility in the
implementation and enforcement of air pollution permitting rules. Still another
might seek a waiver of preemption of a federal regulatory standard that would
otherwise impose a uniform federal rule throughout the nation. Once a petition was
received, the EPA would be required to determine whether granting states the
regulatory flexibility they seek would be consistent with the protection of public
health and the environment in the context of a notice-and-comment rulemaking.
This would allow other states, "public interest" groups, and other affected parties to
assess the proposal and raise concerns before the agency. As with Section 160,
EPA forbearance determinations would be subject to judicial review.
The primary benefit of an ecological forbearance mechanism is that it would
broaden the debate and discussion over the proper roles of the federal and state
cooperative federalism approach).
131. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
132. Jd.
133. Jd. § 160(b).
134. Jd.
135. 5 u.s.c. § 611 (2006).
136. The primary difference between the ecological forbearance proposal described herein and that
suggested by Professor Farber is the emphasis here on state-based forbearance proposals. See FARBER,
supra note 15, at 194-98.
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governments in environmental protection. Both levels of government have a role to
play, but there is little reason to believe that the existing statutory framework
comes anywhere close to the ideal division of authority. To the contrary, the
current allocation of regulatory authority under federal environmental statutes is
quite arbitrary and more the result of historical accident than conscious design. 137
Reforming this system cannot be done overnight, and there is great value in
utilizing policy experimentation to identify the proper balance and improve
environmental protection efforts. Allowing for greater use of state waivers from
federal environmental statutes is one way to achieve this goal.
CONCLUSION

It is somewhat ironic that the contemporary debate over whether to allow
states greater freedom to innovate in environmental law occurs in the context of
climate change. The case for state leadership in the climate case is arguably
weaker than in any other major area of environmental law. Nonetheless, the failure
of the federal government to talce significant action to address global warming fears
has left a vacuum that some state governments have opted to fill. Whether such
efforts are optimal, and whether some can proceed under existing federal law, these
are the climate polices we have thus far. And whether state efforts can produce
significant progress toward the mitigation of climate change, state actions may help
spur a broader reconsideration of the respective roles of the federal and state
governments in environmental law. If so, state climate policies will have done
something important to improve the climate of environmental policy in the United
States.

137. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 19, at 178.

